A former high school teacher brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against her school district and board members, alleging that her termination for posts on a social networking site violated the First Amendment. In Hedgepeth v. Britton, No. 24-1427, 2025 WL 2447077 (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the school district, holding that the termination did not violate the First Amendment because the teacher’s “inflammatory” Facebook posts caused widespread disruption in the school community and beyond. Emphasizing both the substantial fallout from her posts and her prior disciplinary history, the panel concluded that the school district’s efficiency interests outweighed her speech interests.
1. Background
Jeanne Hedgepeth had taught social studies at Palatine High School for twenty years before her dismissal in 2020. The termination followed a series of Facebook posts made during the height of national protests, expressing controversial opinions and vulgar suggestions. Her posts—visible to an audience comprised of roughly 80% former students—elicited more than 130 complaints, media attention, and public criticism, disrupting the Palatine High School community and forcing the school district to divert significant resources to address the situation. Hedgepeth’s speech followed two prior disciplinary suspensions, both involving profanity aimed at students and violations of school district policies regarding professional conduct.
After her termination, Hedgepeth first requested an Illinois State Board of Education review hearing. While that administrative matter was pending, she filed a Section 1983 action against the school district and individual board members. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding Hedgepeth was collaterally estopped by the state administrative proceedings and, alternatively, that her First Amendment claim failed on the merits. She appealed.
2. The Court’s Legal Analysis
The panel framed the dispute under the public-employee speech doctrine. Public employees do not “relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of entering government service.” Instead, “the First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” But just like “private employers, the government needs to exercise control over its employees to provide public services effectively,” so public employees still have “certain limitations on [their] freedom,” which may be particular to that employee’s role and whether it is a public-facing role of “trust.”
There was no dispute that Hedgepeth spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern; thus the question was whether the district’s interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services” outweighed her speech interest under balancing-interests test from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The court reiterated that the employer bears the burden and that the oft-cited seven factors are guideposts, not a “straitjacket,” with the touchstone in the school context being “the effective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.”
Framing the inquiry around the “effective functioning” of the school system, the court held the school district met its burden to show that its operational interests outweighed Hedgepeth’s speech interests. The record contained undisputed evidence that her posts “threw school and district operations into disarray,” unsettled classrooms, derailed summer school discussions, drew local and international media attention, and forced a costly, time-consuming public relations response that diverted staff and resources. In the court’s view, these concrete impacts on work, personnel relationships, and instructional programs squarely implicated the employer’s efficiency interests.
Context carried substantial weight as well. Hedgepeth was a public-facing educator in a position of trust, which affords school employers greater leeway when speech undermines effectiveness and public confidence. The school district also properly considered her two prior suspensions and explicit warnings for similar decorum violations; it was not required to “wait around for a fourth violation,” and could account for both actual and reasonably predictable disruption supported by evidence.
As for Hedgepeth’s numerous alleged defenses, the court rejected her reliance on nominal Facebook privacy: with roughly 80% of her curated audience tied to the PHS community, any claim to private speech was “illusory.” Her posts, “though not technically public, functioned more like a stage whisper than a secret,” predictably circulating among students and faculty and shaping perceptions of her as a teacher. The court also declined to treat the case as a “heckler’s veto.” Students, parents, and staff are essential participants in public education, not outsiders seeking to silence speech, and the school district responded to disruption, not viewpoint. Nor did the speech gain added protection from “special knowledge” or whistleblowing value; by her own account, the posts were jokes or shared views, and her vulgar tone weakened her interest given her role-model responsibilities. On this record, the scale and timing of the fallout created an “insurmountable barrier” to the learning environment, and the court concluded her posts were not protected in this public-employment context.
3. Practical Considerations
Hedgepeth underscores that First Amendment defenses will not insulate off-duty social media speech where employers can demonstrate contemporaneous, objective disruption to operations. Employers should maintain a concrete record of internal complaints, instructional or workflow impacts, diversion of staff and public-relations resources, media attention, and evidence-based forecasts of further disruption. Role and context are decisive: public-facing, trust-dependent positions—particularly where prior discipline and explicit warnings exist—afford greater latitude for employer action when speech undermines effectiveness, workplace relationships, or public confidence. Posts shared with stakeholder-heavy audiences should be treated as effectively public when amplification is foreseeable. Disciplinary decisions should be grounded in operational disruption and policy violations, not viewpoint, and implemented pursuant to clear, consistently enforced social media and decorum policies through a thorough, documented process. Timing is critical: prompt, well-supported action tied to imminent operational needs is more likely to withstand scrutiny.
To read more articles like this one, subscribe to the ALERT Newsletter today!
About The Author
Rachel Schuster is an associate in Sheppard Mullin’s Labor and Employment Practice Group in the firm’s San Diego (Del Mar) office. Ms. Schuster defends employers of all sizes in a broad range of employment matters, including claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, wrongful termination, wage and hour disputes, and contract issues. She has experience handling single-plaintiff lawsuits, class actions, and PAGA cases in both state and federal courts, as well as representing clients in mediation and arbitration. In addition to her litigation practice, Rachel conducts workplace investigations, conducts employment law training sessions, and advises employers on compliance with wage and hour laws, Cal/OSHA regulations, and other employment-related requirements. She drafts, reviews, and updates employee handbooks and workplace policies to ensure legal compliance and best practices.
She has written a number of articles for the Sheppard Mullin Labor and Employment Blog and is a contributing author of the ALERT Newsletter.
Ms. Schuster received her law degree, as well as her undergraduate degree, from the University of California, Berkeley.